A Discussion on Afghanistan,

[deziloooooo]

This is a first try on starting a new thread so please bear with me.
Fareed Zakaria had a discussion on Ambassadore Holbrook and his feelings on Afghanistan, and how he looked at the sitution. Following is part of the discussion
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ZAKARIA: And we are back talking about Richard Holbrooke and his last problem, the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what to do about it.

I'm joined by Les Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations; Joe Klein, "Time" magazine's columnist; and Vali Nasr, who worked for Holbrooke, before that a very distinguished scholar.

There was one point in which during the - during his involvement in Afghanistan where his being tough seems to have backfired, but in a strange way. He was very tough with Karzai on corruption. And this led to a problem, Karzai refused to see him. But the administration allowed that to stand. Explain what happened.

GELB: To me, that was a turning point very early on for the administration policy in Afghanistan and for Dick Holbrooke. Dick understands what it's like to deal with people even more impossible than himself. He dealt with them in the Balkans, and he knew what Karzai was like long before he went - he stepped into the room to meet him. And he knew this wasn't a man you said you have to really work hard to end the corruption in your government and to develop your - he knew that all that would flow off Karzai's back like water. So he was prepared to talk tough to him. And he did, right off the bat, about ending corruption, about delivering on the efficiency of government, about making justice the judicial system.

And, of course, Karzai didn't like it at all, and he was going to test Dick and the American system. So he said, "I'm not seeing this guy anymore." Here was the critical decision, and basically the White House said, well, have Ambassador Holbrooke stay away from him for a while. When they should have said to Karzai, "If you don't see him, you don't see anybody." And it was, I think, a turning point in Karzai's mind as to whether or not he could control the relationship or Washington would.

ZAKARIA: Do you think that the White House showed itself to be weak at that moment?

GELB: I think it showed itself to be very inexperienced.

ZAKARIA: Vali, when Holbrooke framed the problem in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what did he see as the central challenge?

NASR: Well, he - he saw the security challenge, the Taliban, the safe havens, the threat to the United States homeland that could potentially come from there. But he saw this as a very complex picture in which the military played an important role. But that you had to get all the pieces right, and all the pieces had to work together in order for this problem to be solved.

So Afghanistan would have to have a viable government. It would have to have a viable economy. Pakistan would have to be a stable country, and relations between Pakistan and the United States had to improve. And he was constantly trying to make all of these happen at the same time, to put the pieces together and use American power and influence to change essentially the dynamic.

And as Joe said, he delved into the history of this region, he read about the creation of Pakistan, he read extensively on U.S.- Pakistan relations he - on Afghanistan's history. He consulted experts. There was not a scholar on Afghanistan and Pakistan that passed through Washington that didn't come to his office for an hour of - of discussion. And he brought all of these elements, you know, in order to - tried to figure out what is the sequence and way to solve this.

GELB: I think Dick was very pessimistic about Afghanistan and our ability to do anything in Afghanistan. He was before he took the job. He was in the job. But what he had in him was the notion that he still had to bang away at it, he still have to try to solve the problem. We were there. We weren't going to disappear. We weren't going to get out the next day.

So his job, as he saw it, was to try to do - I hate to put it this way - the near impossible.

KLEIN: That was why - that was why the kerfuffle this week about his last words, "Stop the War in Afghanistan," was so kind of hilarious to those of us who knew him. He knew that you couldn't just stop the war. You know, he wanted to see it drawn down. He - he understood that -- it had to have a diplomatic solution and a regional solution rather than a military one.

ZAKARIA: He was to your sense, though, of his general feeling about the Afghanistan War and of Petraeus' counterinsurgency? You spent a lot of time with both Holbrooke and Petraeus.

KLEIN: He was very skeptical about - about the military part of it. He backed the additional 30,000 troops because he was going to stick with his boss, Hillary Clinton. But he was - he didn't think that the military solution could provide a long-term solution.

You know, I had - I have just come back from Afghanistan the day that Richard collapsed. In fact, my first phone call as it often was to him because he was interested in what I had seen down in the south where a lot of the most intense fighting was. And what I had seen was this - that Petraeus' military strategy had succeeded. The Taliban had been removed from their heartland.

But the big test now, right now and for the next six months, is to see whether local Afghan governance can win over this - the people there.

GELB: And did you think they could?

KLEIN: I don't know.

ZAKARIA: And nobody does. The Afghan Army is better today than it was two years ago.

But let me ask you - we have to close. Do you think ultimately the pessimism that Holbrooke had about Afghanistan was rooted in Afghanistan, or is it still the ghosts of Vietnam?

GELB: Well, sure it's the ghosts of Vietnam because here we put everything we had into Vietnam, the South Vietnamese had every incentive to fight for their own freedom, to fix themselves up because they didn't want to be taken over by the North. But they didn't do it.

And I think what Dick understood from that war, what our generation understood from it, was that as soon as you start explaining everything about that country in terms of what we're going to do, we, we, we, it means the war is lost. And almost every conversation you have about Afghanistan, it's what we're going to do, are we going to make the Afghan army stronger, are we going to fix their judicial system? The discussion has to be about they. And if it isn't, it means we've got a fundamental problem.

ZAKARIA: On that fundamental problem, we will - we will close. We will doubtless reconvene to talk about Afghanistan, but not ever again with Richard Holbrooke.

Les Gelb, Joe Klein, Vali Nasr, thank you all. And we will be right back

[deziloooooo]

Ok, it worked .. while I am a supporter of Obama over all and am not faulting him on his Afghanistan policy , yet, and if it doesn't work, well he at least had a policy that came about with much discussion, perameters put forth and input by all parts of government and the military but there was one point that intrigued me on the above thread..
"And, of course, Karzai didn't like it at all, and he was going to test Dick and the American system. So he said, "I'm not seeing this guy anymore." Here was the critical decision, and basically the White House said, well, have Ambassador Holbrooke stay away from him for a while. When they should have said to Karzai, "If you don't see him, you don't see anybody." And it was, I think, a turning point in Karzai's mind as to whether or not he could control the relationship or Washington would.

ZAKARIA: Do you think that the White House showed itself to be weak at that moment?

GELB: I think it showed itself to be very inexperienced.

[❤ mollymouser ❤]

I'm not sure I'm following this thread.... is there a question in here?