Additional SCOTUS rulings this week. Updates on page 2

[EVT1]

The factory of the future will have only two employees, a man and a dog. The man will be there to feed the dog. The dog will be there to keep the man from touching the equipment.
 

[NoNamePerson]

Dec 15, 2014 12:18:48 GMT -5 EVT1 said:

The factory of the future will have only two employees, a man and a dog. The man will be there to feed the dog. The dog will be there to keep the man from touching the equipment.
 

[Wisconsin Beth]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
JESINOSKI
ET UX
.
v
.
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS,
INC.,
ET
AL
.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–684. Argued November 4, 2014—Decided January 13, 2015
Exactly three years after borrowing money from respondent Country
-
wide Home Loans, Inc., to refinance their home mortgage, petitioners
Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski sent Countrywide and respondent Bank
of America Home Loans, which had acquired Countrywide, a letter
purporting to rescind the transaction. Bank of America replied, re
-
fusing to acknowledge th
e rescission’s validity. One year and one day
later, the Jesinoskis filed suit in
federal court, seeking a declaration
of rescission and damages. The Di
strict Court entered judgment on
the pleadings for respondents, concluding that a borrower can exer
-
cise the Truth in Lending Act’s right
to rescind a loan, see 15 U. S. C.
§1635(a), (f), only by filing a lawsui
t within three years of the date
the loan was consummated. The Je
sinoskis’ complaint, filed four
years and one day after the loan’s
consummation, was ineffective.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held
: A borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only
provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file
suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s unequivocal terms—a bor
-
rower “shall have the right to rescind . . .
by notifying the creditor
. . .
of his intention to do so
” (emphasis added)—leave no doubt that re
-
scission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his in
-
tention to rescind. This conclusion
is not altered by §1635(f), which
states
when
the right to rescind must be
exercised, but says nothing
about
how
that right is exercised. No
r does §1635(g)—which states
that “in addition to rescission the court may award relief . . . not re
-
lating to the right to rescind”—suppo
rt respondents’ view that rescis
-
sion is necessarily a consequence of
judicial action. And the fact that
the Act modified the common-law condition precedent to rescission at
2
JESINOSKI
v.
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.
Syllabus
law, see §1635(b), hardly implies that
the Act thereby codified rescis
-
sion in equity. Pp. 2–5.
729 F. 3d 1092, reversed and remanded.
S
CALIA
,
J.,
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[Wisconsin Beth]

1
(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2014
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See
United States
v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WHITFIELD
v
. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–9026. Argued December 2, 2014—Decided January 13, 2015
Petitioner Whitfield, fleeing a bo
tched bank robbery, entered 79-year
-
old Mary Parnell’s home and guided a terrified Parnell from a hall
-
way to a room a few feet away, where she suffered a fatal heart at
-
tack. He was convicted of, among ot
her things, violating 18 U. S. C.
§2113(e), which establishes enhanced
penalties for anyone who “forc
-
es any person to accompany him wi
thout the consent of such person”
in the course of committing or fleei
ng from a bank robbery. On ap
-
peal, the Fourth Circuit held that the movement Whitfield required
Parnell to make satisfied the force
d-accompaniment requirement, re
-
jecting his argument that §2113(e) requires “substantial” movement.
Held
: A bank robber “forces person to accompany him,” for purposes
of §2113(e), when he forces that pe
rson to go somewhere with him,
even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or over
a short distance, as was the case
here. At the time the forced-
accompaniment provision was enacted,
just as today, to “accompany”
someone meant to “go with” him. The word does
not, as Whitfield
contends, connote movement over
a substantial distance. Accompa
-
niment requires movement that woul
d normally be described as from
one place to another. Here, Whitfield forced Parnell to accompany
him for at least several feet, from on
e room to another, and that sure
-
ly sufficed. The severity of the penalties for a forced-accompaniment
conviction—a mandatory minimum of 10 years, and a maximum of
life imprisonment—does not militate against this interpretation, for
the danger of a forced accompanimen
t does not vary depending on the
distance traversed. This reading also does not make any other part
of §2113’s graduated penalty scheme superfluous. Pp. 2–5.
548 Fed. Appx. 70, affirmed.
S
CALIA
,
J.,
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[Wisconsin Beth]

Sorry about the formatting.  I copies and pasted summaries from www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-684_ba7d.pdf and www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-9026_11o2.pdf

[Wisconsin Beth]

And today we have


The opinion in T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell is www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-975_8n6a.pdf. The Court holds that localities must explain denials of permission to build cell phone towers.
The opinion in Jennings v. Stephens is www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-7211_8o6a.pdf . The Court holds that a habeas petitioner who wins does not have to file notice of appeal to preserve winning theory on appeal.

[Wisconsin Beth]

So yesterday we had

The opinion in Holt v. Hobbs is here; prison may not prohibit 1/2 inch beard compelled by religious beliefs.
The summary reversal in Christeson, a capital case, is here.
The opinion in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. is here. Appellate review of factual matters relating to claim construction is for clear error, not de novo.


*-*-


Additional decisions coming today too. 

[Wisconsin Beth]

The opinion in Hana v. Hana is here. Per J. Sotomayor, trademark tacking is a jury question.
The opinion in Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp. is here. Per J. Ginsburg, dismissal of an action in multidistrict litigation triggers a right to appeal.
The opinion in Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean is here. Per the Chief Justice, disclosure by the Air Marshal in this case was not prohibited by law.

[Virgil Showlion]

Am I right in understanding that in the Whitfield case, he was trying to get out of a penalty for forcibly relocating a robbery victim because she dropped dead while he was doing it?

How does something like that make it all the way to the USSC?

[billisonboard]

Jan 21, 2015 14:25:53 GMT -5 Virgil Showlion said:

Am I right in understanding that in the Whitfield case, he was trying to get out of a penalty for forcibly relocating a robbery victim because she dropped dead while he was doing it?

How does something like that make it all the way to the USSC?

WHITFIELD v . UNITED STATES
Whitfield was evading capture for an attempted bank robber and invaded a home. He encountered an occupant in a hallway and "... guided her from the hallway to a computer room ..." There is an enhanced sentencing possibility "Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense . ...forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, ...". The question before the court was whether or not the distance of 4 to 9 feet met the criteria of "force ... to accompany". The court ruled it did.

It also appears to me that one should take care in using "forcibly relocating". There could be the implication that it is more than just a verbal command. It appears to me that nothing more than lack of consent is required.

[Virgil Showlion]

Jan 21, 2015 15:02:27 GMT -5 billisonboard said:

Jan 21, 2015 14:25:53 GMT -5 Virgil Showlion said:

Am I right in understanding that in the Whitfield case, he was trying to get out of a penalty for forcibly relocating a robbery victim because she dropped dead while he was doing it?

How does something like that make it all the way to the USSC?

WHITFIELD v . UNITED STATES
Whitfield was evading capture for an attempted bank robber and invaded a home. He encountered an occupant in a hallway and "... guided her from the hallway to a computer room ..." There is an enhanced sentencing possibility "Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense . ...forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, ...". The question before the court was whether or not the distance of 4 to 9 feet met the criteria of "force ... to accompany". The court ruled it did.

It also appears to me that one should take care in using "forcibly relocating". There could be the implication that it is more than just a verbal command. It appears to me that nothing more than lack of consent is required.

Is there any indication of whether the distance would have been larger if the woman hadn't suffered a heart attack?

At any rate, good on the courts for getting it right.

[Wisconsin Beth]

Yesterday the Justices issued one opinion in an argued case, vacating and remanding the decision of the Sixth Circuit in M&G Polymers v. Tackett, a dispute between an employer and its retired employees over the vesting of health-care benefits.

from www.scotusblog.com/